[PATCH] crypto/openssl: fix memory leak in auth processing function
Didier Pallard
didier.pallard at 6wind.com
Tue Apr 18 16:26:19 CEST 2023
Contexts allocated with EVP_MAC_CTX_new calls are leaking, they are created
then overwritten by the return value of EVP_MAC_CTX_dup call.
Fixes: 75adf1eae44f ("crypto/openssl: update HMAC routine with 3.0 EVP API")
Fixes: 2b9c693f6ef5 ("crypto/openssl: support AES-CMAC operations")
Signed-off-by: Didier Pallard <didier.pallard at 6wind.com>
Cc: stable at dpdk.org
---
drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd.c | 7 -------
1 file changed, 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd.c b/drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd.c
index 384d26262105..e00db0facba5 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd.c
@@ -1797,7 +1797,6 @@ process_openssl_auth_op(struct openssl_qp *qp, struct rte_crypto_op *op,
# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_h;
EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_c;
- EVP_MAC *mac;
# else
HMAC_CTX *ctx_h;
CMAC_CTX *ctx_c;
@@ -1818,10 +1817,7 @@ process_openssl_auth_op(struct openssl_qp *qp, struct rte_crypto_op *op,
break;
case OPENSSL_AUTH_AS_HMAC:
# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
- mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, "HMAC", NULL);
- ctx_h = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac);
ctx_h = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(sess->auth.hmac.ctx);
- EVP_MAC_free(mac);
status = process_openssl_auth_mac(mbuf_src, dst,
op->sym->auth.data.offset, srclen,
ctx_h);
@@ -1836,10 +1832,7 @@ process_openssl_auth_op(struct openssl_qp *qp, struct rte_crypto_op *op,
break;
case OPENSSL_AUTH_AS_CMAC:
# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
- mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, OSSL_MAC_NAME_CMAC, NULL);
- ctx_c = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac);
ctx_c = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(sess->auth.cmac.ctx);
- EVP_MAC_free(mac);
status = process_openssl_auth_mac(mbuf_src, dst,
op->sym->auth.data.offset, srclen,
ctx_c);
--
2.30.2
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